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Controlled Sequential Information Fusion with Social Sensors
Sujay Bhatt and Vikram Krishnamurthy, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—A network of social sensors estimate an unknown
state of nature by performing Bayesian Social Learning, and
myopically optimize individual reward functions. The decisions
of the social sensors contain quantized information about the
underlying state. How should a fusion center dynamically incen-
tivize the social sensors for acquiring the information about the
underlying state?
This paper presents four results. First, sufficient conditions
on the model parameters are provided under which the optimal
policy for the fusion center has a threshold structure. The optimal
policy is determined in closed form, and is such that it switches
between two exactly specified incentive policies at the threshold.
Second, a sample path characterization of the optimal threshold
policy is provided, i.e, the nature of the incentives (average trend
over time) resulting from the fusion center employing the optimal
threshold policy. It is shown that the optimal incentive sequence
is a sub-martingale, i.e, the optimal incentives increase on average
over time. Third, it is shown that it is possible for the fusion center
to learn the true state asymptotically by employing a sub-optimal
policy; in other words, controlled information fusion with social
sensors can be consistent. Finally, uniform bounds on the average
additional cost incurred by the fusion center for employing a
sub-optimal policy are provided. This characterizes the trade-off
between the cost of information acquisition and consistency, for
the fusion center.
I. INTRODUCTION
A social sensor1 is an information processing system that
differs from a physical sensor in the following ways:
i.) Social sensors influence the behavior of other sensors,
whereas physical sensors typically do not affect other
sensors.
ii.) Social sensors reveal quantized information (decisions)
and have dynamics, whereas physical sensors are static
with the dynamics modeled in the state equation.
Social learning is the process by which social sensors are
influenced by the behaviour of other sensors in a multi-
sensor network. The availability of online social media review
platforms like Yelp, Expedia, Amazon etc, facilitates social
learning; see [1], [2]. Social learning shares similarities with
decentralized detection [3], [4] that falls within the class of
team decision theory [5], [6]; but with key differences: Decen-
tralized detection quantizes the observations, whereas social
learning quantizes the Bayesian belief [7]. In decentralized
detection the fusion policies are directly optimized, where as
in social learning the fusion rule is prescribed and is Bayesian.
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1A social (human) sensor provides information about its state (sentiment,
social situation, quality of product) to a social network after interaction with
other social sensors. In this paper, in line with a large body of literature, we
adopt a more stylized definition: a social sensor performs social learning.
Information Fusion with Social Sensors
Data fusion with physical sensors is a well studied problem.
In this paper, motivated by recent applications using online
social media review platforms, we consider information fusion
with social sensors. We consider the following problem: A
sequence of social sensors estimate an unknown state of
nature, and a fusion center aims to estimate the underlying
state by incentivizing the social sensors. How should the
fusion center dynamically incentivize the social sensors for
acquiring information about the underlying state? Equivalently,
how can the fusion center optimize the trade-off between the
cost of information acquisition from the social sensors versus
the usefulness of the information in terms of reduction in
uncertainty (mean-square error between the true state and the
estimate) of the Bayesian state estimate.
The problem of information fusion with social sensors
considered in this paper deals with combining the decisions of
the social sensors, correlated due to social learning, to make
an informed decision regarding the underlying state (that is
being estimated). Information fusion with social sensors is
challenging due to the fact that social learning leads to in-
efficiencies [7]–[9] like herds (sensors choose the same action
irrespective of their private information) and informational
cascades (information fusion results in no improvement in
uncertainty). So having more social sensors need not always be
advantageous (in terms of reduced mean square error between
the state estimate and the true state).
Multi-sensor data fusion [10] on the other hand, refers to
the problem of data acquisition, processing, and fusion of
information, to provide a better estimate of the underlying
state. A data fusion center gathers the information from the
peripheral sensors (physical sensors) to make an informed
decision regarding the desired parameter. Having more number
of sensors leads to improvement in reliability, resolution,
coverage, and confidence; see [10].
Traditionally, information fusion is open-loop; in this paper,
we use feedback control to choose incentives to control how
the sensors provide information. Hence we name the problem
considered in this paper as controlled information fusion. The
fusion is Bayesian and we are interested in designing the
control laws for providing optimal incentives for social sensors
that will result in accurate Bayesian estimates.
Controlled Sensing vs Controlled Information Fusion
Controlled sensing [11] refers to the stochastic control
problem where a controller decides how the network of sensors
should adapt so as to obtain improved measurements; or
alternatively minimize a measurement cost. Some common ap-
plications include sensor scheduling [12], [13], measurement
control [14], [15], and active hypothesis testing [16]–[18].
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Fig. 1: Visual illustration of the main result of the paper, namely the optimal incentive policy for choosing incentives to social sensors to
reveal information to the fusion center. In general, the incentive policy could be an arbitrary function of pi as in Fig.1b; we provide conditions
under which the incentive policy is as in Fig.1a. Here µ∗(pi) ∈ [0, 1] is the optimal incentive policy and pi denotes the estimate of the state
computed from the fusion of sensors’ decisions. e1 and e2 denote the indicator vectors. When p = µ
∗(pi) = 0, the fusion center should
not incentivize. The optimal policy is a choice between two exactly specified incentive policies, and hence is determined in closed form.
Sec.V-A provides numerical examples (of more general cost functions) where the optimal incentive policy is a multi-threshold as in Fig.1b.
In controlled fusion, unlike controlled sensing, the process
of incentivization modifies the cost or reward function of the
social sensors and hence directly affects the sensors’ decisions
(see Fig.2). The decisions are a quantization of the Bayesian
estimate of the state, and hence controlling the incentives can
shape the information that is subsequently fused. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address controlled
information fusion when the sensors are performing Bayesian
social learning.
Example – Elicitation of honest reviews in social media:
Many online social media review platforms like Amazon, Yelp,
TripAdvisor, Airbnb etc, encourage sharing experiences of
services, products, and vendors. Such review platforms offer
the following benefits: (i) future customers are influenced
by them, and (ii) the retailers can act on them to improve
the quality of product or service. However, if such review
platforms are to be a reliable source of information, the
customers should leave an honest review. A review is honest2
if it reflects customer’s observations and experiences. How to
dynamically incentivize the customers to encourage them to
leave an honest review? (see Sec.II-C)
Main Results and Organization
In the context of controlled information fusion, this paper
has 3 main results:
(1.) Optimality of Threshold Incentive Policy: Sec.III-B,
gives sufficient conditions on the model parameters under
which the optimal incentive policy for the fusion center has
a threshold structure (see Fig.1a). Indeed we will show that
the optimal policy switches between two exactly specified
incentive policies at the threshold, and hence is completely
determined in closed form. Since the optimal policy is deter-
mined in closed form, the fusion center only needs to store the
2 In [19], the authors discuss how they incentivized people to share honest
reviews of their books. The authors gave a free copy of their book Unicorn
Genesis: Origins to customers who left an honest review on their other book
Unicorn Western Full Saga.
In [20], incentive feedback systems are designed using a (non-Bayesian)
scoring method to elicit truthful (honest) responses from workers (sensors).
This method is termed Peer-prediction, and is formulated as a mechanism
design problem, where a feedback system provides rewards to the workers
depending on how well their responses match their peers’ responses. See
[21] and the references therein for a discussion on the shortcomings of Peer-
prediction method.
threshold state π∗ and the incentive function, so a threshold
policy is practically useful.
(2.) Sub-martingale Property of Optimal Incentive Se-
quence: While Sec.III-B establishes the structure of the op-
timal incentive policy, Sec. III-C establishes the sample path
properties of the optimal incentive sequence. In particular, we
show that the optimal incentive sequence is a sub-martingale;
i.e, the incentives increase on average over time. This property
is useful in assessing the reliability of the fusion center. In a
related context, our result is similar to the super-martingale
property of pricing policies in economics [22], [23]; which
says that the optimal pricing policy for charging sensors
(performing social learning) who purchase a product, is to
start high, establish an elite customer base, and then decrease
prices to increase profits.
(3.) Consistency of Controlled Information Fusion: Infor-
mation fusion with social sensors is challenging due to the
fact that social learning terminates after a finite horizon [11],
[24] due to the formation of information cascades. Sec. IV
shows how the fusion center can control the incentives and
learn the true state asymptotically by employing a sub-optimal
policy; in other words, how to control the incentives such
that the information fusion with social sensors is consistent
(convergence in probability). However, by employing a sub-
optimal policy, the fusion center incurs additional cost. There-
fore, uniform bounds on the average additional cost incurred
by the fusion center for employing a sub-optimal policy are
provided. These bounds characterize the trade-off between the
cost of information acquisition and consistency, for the fusion
center.
Sec. V presents numerical examples that provide additional
insights on the main results.
II. SOCIAL LEARNING MODEL AND FUSION CENTER
OBJECTIVE
We consider the setup illustrated in Fig. 2. The fusion center
controls the incentives given to the social sensors, and the
social sensors share their decisions (quantized information on
the underlying state) with the fusion center. Sec.II-A describes
the controlled fusion social learning model that governs the
manner in which the social sensors learn from each other, and
how this behavior is influenced by the fusion center. Sec.II-B
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Fig. 2: The network of social sensors perform Bayesian social
learning to estimate the realization of a random variable x, and take
a decision ak after myopically optimizing a reward function. The
fusion center provides incentives pk ∈ [0, 1] at each time k (or at
each sensor k) and fuses the information gathered in a Bayesian
way. Each incentive pk is computed as a function µ of the posterior
probability mass function of the state (public belief) pik−1 at time
k− 1. The public belief pik−1 is computed from the decisions of the
first k − 1 sensors. The decision ak of social sensor k depends on
the incentive pk, the public belief pik−1, and the private observation
yk of the the state x.
formulates the objective of the fusion center that captures the
trade-off between the cost of information acquisition from
the social sensors versus the usefulness of the information
measured.
A. Controlled Fusion Social Learning Model
Let k = 1, 2, · · · denote the discrete time instants. It is
assumed that each sensor decides once3 in a predetermined
sequential order indexed by k. Let xk ∈ X = {1, 2} denote the
state of nature4. The state x is assumed to be a random vari-
able chosen at k = 0. The fusion center dynamically chooses
the incentives at each sensor k to estimate the realization of
the random variable x. Let the probability mass function of
the state at time k − 1 be denoted as
πk−1(i) = P(x = i|a1, . . . , ak−1). (1)
The state estimate (1) is computed from the decisions of the
social sensors a1, . . . , ak−1 and is termed as the public belief.
Let the initial estimate be denoted as π0 = (π0(i), i ∈ X ),
where π0(i) = P(x0 = i). Let the belief space, i.e, the set of
distributions π over the state be denoted as
Π(2)
∆
={π ∈ R2 : π(1)+π(2) = 1, 0 ≤ π(i) ≤ 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}}.
Social Sensor Dynamics: A social sensor, unlike a physi-
cal sensor, has its own dynamics since it learns from previous
actions of other social sensors. It receives an observation on
3The classical social learning model is sequential and each sensor acts once;
see [7], [8], [24]. Repeated social learning over graphs is also well studied;
see [25] and the references there in.
4Two states is common in machine learning using Crowdsourcing, for
example, in image annotation, labelling etc; see [26]. More recently, in
crowdsourced classification of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); see [27].
the underlying state, computes an estimate (private belief) us-
ing the information revealed by other sensors (their decisions),
and takes an action to myopically maximize a reward function.
This action/ decision is a quantization of the (private) belief,
and is shared with the fusion center and other sensors.
1.) Social Sensor’s Private Observation: Each social sensor
k’s obtains a noisy yk ∈ Y = {1, 2} of the underlying state x
with he observation likelihood distribution:
Bij = P(yk = j|x = i). (2)
The (discrete) observation likelihood distribution models the
(limited) information gathering capabilities of the sensor.
2.) Social Learning and Private Belief update: Sensor k up-
dates its private belief ηyk by fusing observation yk and the
prior public belief πk−1, via the following classical Bayesian
update
ηyk =
Bykπk−1
1′Bykπk−1
(3)
where Byk denotes the diagonal matrix[
P(yk|x = 1) 0
0 P(yk|x = 2)
]
and 1 denotes the 2-dimensional vector of ones.
3.) Social Sensor’s Action: Sensor k executes an action ak ∈
A = {1, 2} myopically to maximize the reward5. Let
r(x, y, ak) denote the reward accrued if the sensor takes action
ak when the underlying state is x and the observation is y.
For notational simplicity, we assume that all social sensors
have the same reward function r(x, y, a) with
r(x, y, a) = δap− αaI(a 6= x)− βaI(a 6= y)− γa. (4)
Here δa, αa, βa, γa ∈ [0, 1]. The reward (4) is inspired by
the quasi-linear utility in [30]. Here, δa is interpreted as the
fraction of the monetary compensation p received, αa and βa
are the losses incurred for not taking appropriate actions, and
γa is the cost incurred in information acquisition.
Let r(x, a) =
∑2
j=1 r(x, y = j, a)Bxj . The sensor chooses an
action ak to maximize the reward:
ak = arg max
a∈A
r′aηyk , ra = [r(1, a) r(2, a)]. (5)
Information Fusion cost: The fusion center minimizes the
following cost of information fusion c(pk), with
c(pk) = pk − Φs(k)I(ak = yk|πk−1). (6)
Here (6) models the trade-off between the cost of information
acquisition (pk) from the social sensors versus usefulness
of the information I(ak = yk|πk−1). The information from
different sensors is allowed to be weighed differently using
Φs(k) ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, we assume the weights to
be same for all sensors; i.e Φs(k) = φs, ∀ k. Let us
briefly discuss the cost (6). We show in Sec. IV that a = y
corresponds to informative6 decisions. Since the sensors take
5Each sensor being an expected reward maximizer is in line with being
rational; see [24]. See [28], [29] for models considering a mix of rational and
irrational sensors.
6Here informativeness is in the sense of Blackwell [11]; see also Footnote 8.
Acting according to self valuations (a = y) is in line with the objective of
truthful information reporting in Peer Prediction literature; see [20].
into account the actions or decisions of the preceding sensors,
fusion of informative decisions leads to improved estimate of
the parameter, and hence improves the usefulness of informa-
tion (in terms of reduction in the uncertainty of the Bayesian
state estimate) fused by the fusion center and the successive
sensors.
Public Belief Dynamics: The fusion center shares sensor
k’s decision with the multi-agent sensor network and the pub-
lic belief (1) is updated (by the fusion center and subsequent
sensors) according to the social learning Bayesian filter (see
[11], [31]) as follows:
πk = T
π(πk−1, ak) =
R
πk−1
ak πk−1
1′R
πk−1
ak πk−1
. (7)
Here, R
πk−1
ak = diag(P(ak|x = i, πk−1), i ∈ X ) is the deci-
sion or action likelihood matrix (compare with the observation
likelihood matrix B in (2)), where
Rπia = P(ak|x = i, πk−1) =
∑
y∈Y
P(ak|y, πk−1)P(y|x = i), (8)
P(ak|y, πk−1) =
{
1 if ak = arg max
a∈A
r′aηyk ;
0 otherwise.
Note that πk ∈ Π(2).
Remark (Information Cascade). Note that the (decision)
likelihood probability (8) is an explicit function of the prior
(public belief) πk−1. This is unlike a standard Bayesian update
(like (3)), where the likelihood is independent of the prior.
This unusual update of the social learning filter leads to
herding behavior: In (8), if the action becomes independent
of the observation, Rπia = 1 or 0. This in turn leads to
information cascade, social learning stops as the public belief
is frozen, as can be seen from (7). It can be shown that
(Theorem 5.3.1, [11]) social learning stops in finite time.
Information Fusion Incentive: The fusion center incen-
tivizes/compensates the social sensors for providing informa-
tion about the underlying state. The fusion center dynamically
adapts these incentives over time as the sensors perform social
learning: each sensor will have a different expected reward.
Let Fk denote the history of past incentives and decisions
{π0, p1, a1, · · · , pk−1, ak} recorded by the fusion center and
the network of social sensors. More technically,
Fk := σ−algebra generated by (π0, a1, . . . , ak, p1, . . . , pk−1).
(9)
The fusion center chooses the incentive as pk+1 = µ(Fk),
for the sensor k + 1 to provide information about its state
via social learning. Here µ denotes the decision policy that
associates the history Fk with an incentive pk+1. Since Fk is
increasing with time k (filtration), to implement a controller,
it is useful to obtain a sufficient statistic that does not grow
in dimension. The public belief πk computed via the social
learning filter (7) forms a sufficient statistic for Fk and the
incentive in is given as
pk+1 = µ(πk) ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
B. Controlled Information Fusion Objective
Given the setup in Sec.II-A, the aim of the fusion center
is estimate the state x by minimizing the cost of information
acquisition (p). As discussed in (7), the fusion center performs
Bayesian fusion of the information revealed by the social
sensors. For each initial distribution π0, the following cost
is associated for the fusion center:
Jµ(π) = Eµ{
∞∑
k=1
ρkcµ(pk)|π0 = π}. (11)
Here pk denotes the incentive, ρ ∈ [0, 1) denotes an eco-
nomic discount factor, µ denotes the decision policy for the
fusion center that maps the public belief (1) to an incentive
pk ∈ [0, 1], i.e, pk = µ(πk−1), cµ(pk) denotes the cost of
information fusion incurred at time k by the fusion center
by employing the decision policy µ, and Eµ denotes the
expectation conditioned on the policy µ.
The policy µ can be restricted to the class of stationary
(time invariant) policies for the infinite horizon discounted cost
objective; see [11]. The fusion center aims to find the optimal
stationary policy µ∗ such that
Jµ∗(π0) = infµ∈µJµ(π0) (12)
where µ denotes the class of stationary policies.
Summary: (11) is the optimization objective and (7) are the
dynamics for the controlled information fusion problem con-
sidered in this paper. The model parameters are the sensors’
observation matrix B in (2) and the reward ra in (4).
C. Example: Social Media Review Platform
We briefly motivate the above model and optimization
objective in terms of online social media review platforms
like Amazon or Airbnb. The information fusion objective
is to estimate the product or service quality. The state
x ∈ {1(Bad quality), 2(Good quality)}, the observation y ∈
{1(Bad experience), 2(Good experience)}, and the customers’
decision a ∈ {1(Negative Review), 2(Positive Review)}.
When the customer writes a good/ bad review when it has
a good/ bad experience, the review is honest. The reward
parameters δap indicates the compensation in exchange for
the review after tax, αa models the cost incurred for making
a decision not appropriate for the quality, βa models the
cost incurred for making a decision not appropriate for the
information gathered on the quality, and γa models the cost
of acquiring information/ cost of writing the review. Here it
is assumed that each customer leaves a review7, however, the
nature of review depends on the optimization (5). The review
platform shares the incentive values8 in addition to the reviews
with the customers to avoid the perception of skewing reviews.
7This can be achieved, for example, by providing free shipping and smaller
handling time in case of an e-commerce social media review platform like
Amazon.
8This is currently not provided by popular review sharing platforms.
Disclosing incentives in the review context would ensure transparency, and
would serve to reinforce the authenticity of the customer feedback.
III. STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL INCENTIVE POLICIES
This section has three results. Sec.III-A formulates solving
for the optimal incentive policy (12) as a stochastic dynamic
programming problem. Sec.III-B provides sufficient conditions
on the model parameters (B, ra) under which the optimal
incentive policy for the fusion center can be completely
specified as a threshold policy. Sec.III-C provides a sample
path characterization of the optimal incentive sequence that
results from fusion center employing the optimal threshold
policy.
A. Dynamic Programming Formulation
The optimal incentive policy µ∗ in (12) and the correspond-
ing optimal cost (value function) V (π) satisfy the Bellman’s
stochastic dynamic programming equation [11]:
Q(π, p) = c(p) + ρ
∑
a∈A
V (T π(π, a))σ(π, a), (13)
µ∗(π) = arg min
p∈[0,1]
Q(π, p),
V (π) = min
p∈[0,1]
Q(π, p), Jµ∗(π0) = V (π0).
where T π(π, a) is defined in (7) and σ(π, a) = 1′Rπaπ, and
c(p) is the information fusion cost defined in (6).
Discussion: Even though Bellman’s equation (13) specifies the
optimal policy, it has two problems:
(i) The state (belief) space Π(2) is an uncountable set. Hence
the dynamic programming equation (13) does not translate
into practical solution methodologies, as the optimal cost V (π)
needs to be evaluated at each π ∈ Π(2).
(ii) The action (incentive) space for the information fusion
center p ∈ [0, 1] is a continuum. It is well known [11] that
even for a finite action case, computing the optimal policies
is a computationally intractable PSPACE hard problem.
B. Structure of the Optimal Incentive Policy
We wish to determine conditions under which the optimal
incentive policy has the following intuitive threshold structure:
don’t incentivize if the estimate π < π∗, and incentivize using
an exactly specified incentive function otherwise. Some of the
advantages of the threshold policy are: (i) To compute the
threshold policy (as in Fig.1a), one only needs to compute the
single belief π∗; whereas a general policy (as in Fig.1b) re-
quires PSPACE hard dynamic programming recursion offline.
(ii) To implement a controller with a threshold policy, one
only needs to encode π∗ and the incentive function, so its
practically useful.
Incentive Function: For future reference, we define the in-
centive function of the fusion center ∆(ηy) ∈ [0, 1] as
∆(ηy) = [l1 − l2]
Byπ
1′Byπ
+ l3 (14)
where ηy is the private belief update (3),
l1 =
α2 + β2B11 − β1B12
δ2 − δ1
, l2 =
α1 − β2B21 + β1B22
δ2 − δ1
,
l3 =
γ2−γ1
δ2−δ1
, and α, β, δ, γ are as in (4).
The incentive function (14) naturally arises9 by reformulat-
ing (5). The parameters in the incentive function are chosen
such that l1 > 0, l2 > 0 and l3 > 0. A sufficient condition is
such that α1 > α2 ≥ β1 > β2, δ2 > δ1 and γ2 > γ1.
Model Assumptions: We now give sufficient conditions un-
der which the optimal incentive policy (13) has a threshold
structure.
(A1) The observation distribution Bxy = P(y|x) is TP2
(totally positive of order 2), i.e, the determinant of the
matrix B is non-negative.
(A2) The reward vector ra is supermodular, i.e, r(1, 1) >
r(2, 1) and r(2, 2) > r(1, 2) for every p ∈ [0, 1].
(A1) is an assumption on the underlying stochastic model,
and enables the comparison of the posteriors. The observation
distribution being TP2 [11] implies that in higher states, the
probability of receiving higher observations is higher than in
lower states.
(A2) is required for the problem to be non-trivial. If it does
not hold and r(i, 1) > r(i, 2) for i = 1, 2, then a = 1 always
dominates a = 2; the sensors provide no useful information.
Main Result: (Optimality of Threshold Incentive Policy)
Theorem 1 below is our first main result. It provides a
closed form expression for the optimal policy µ∗(π) of the
controlled information fusion problem: the optimal policy has
threshold structure (as illustrated in Fig.1a). The choice over
a continuum of actions is reduced to a choice between two
exactly specified incentive policies.
Theorem 1. Under (A1) and (A2), the optimal incentive policy
defined in (12) is given explicitly as:
µ∗(π) =
{
0 if π(2) ∈ [0, π∗s (2));
∆(ηy=2) if π(2) ∈ [π
∗
s (2), 1].
(15)
Here the threshold state π∗s (2) ∈ (0, 1) depends on the choice
of φs ∈ (0, 1) defined in (6), and the parameters in the
incentive function ∆(ηy=2) defined in (14).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Discussion: According to Theorem 1, computing the opti-
mal incentive policy is equivalent to finding the belief π∗s (2),
below which it is optimal not to provide any incentive p = 0;
and above which it is optimal to incentivize using ∆(ηy=2)
at every belief, to minimize the cost (see Fig.1a). Therefore,
the controlled information fusion problem reduces to a finite
dimensional optimization problem of finding a threshold state
π∗. Theorem 1 provides a closed form expression for the
optimal policy of the controlled information fusion problem:
the choice over a continuum of actions is reduced to a choice
between two exactly specified policies: µ(π) = 0, ∀ π and
µ(π) = ∆(ηy=2), ∀ π.
The practical usefulness of Theorem 1 stems from the
following: (i) the search space of decision policies µ reduces
from an infinite class of functions (over Π(2)) to those that
switch once between the specified policies; (ii) at each instant
(or belief) the fusion center only needs to decide between
9See also the proof of Theorem 3.
p = ∆(ηy=2) and p = 0; (iii) the region in the belief space
Π(2) where it is optimal to incentivize using ∆(ηy=2) is
connected and convex (compare Fig.1a versus Fig.1b).
C. Sub-martingale Property of Optimal Incentive Sequence
Theorem 1 characterized the structure of the optimal in-
centive policy for controlled information fusion. A natural
question is: How does the actual sample path of the optimal
incentive sequence behave? Theorem 2 below gives a complete
sample path characterization of optimal incentive policy imple-
mented by the fusion center. It is shown that when the fusion
center aims to minimize the expected payout for gathering
truthful information to reduce the uncertainty in the Bayesian
state estimate, the incentive sequence is a sub-martingale10;
i.e, it increases on average11 over time.
Theorem 2. Consider the information fusion problem with
optimal policy µ∗(π) in (15). Under (A1), the optimal incentive
sequence pk = µ
∗(πk−1) is a sub-martingale.
Discussion: Typically in stochastic control problems, it
is difficult to characterize the optimal control sequence; one
can only characterize the optimal control policy. Theorem 2 is
interesting because we can characterize the optimal sequence
of incentives as a sub-martingale. According to Theorem 2, the
optimal incentive policy of the fusion center is such that the
sample path of the incentive sequence displays an increasing
trend, i.e, the incentives increase on average over time.
The usefulness of Theorem 2 stems from the following: (i) it
gives a complete sample path characterization of the optimal
incentive policy implemented by the fusion center; (ii) the
sub-martingale property assures that the average incentives
should always increase over time. This is useful in assessing
the reliability of the fusion center.
Bayesian Filter
Information
Fusion Center
Social Sensor k
Incentive pk
Public Belief πk+1 Decision ak
Private Belief ηyk
Fig. 3: Bi-directional interaction between the information fusion cen-
ter and the social sensor. The fusion center provides an incentive pk to
the social sensor, which has a private belief ηyk after observation yk.
The social sensor takes a decision ak and this quantized information
on the underlying state is used to update the public belief pik+1
using a social learning Bayesian filter (7). The incentive pk at time k
directly modifies the reward function of the social sensor, and hence
affects the state estimate pik+1 at time k + 1.
10See Appendix for definition.
11Here average is over different iterations of the estimation process. For
example, each round of labelling/classification in Crowdsourcing can be seen
as one iteration.
IV. CONSISTENCY OF CONTROLLED INFORMATION
FUSION
An elementary application of the martingale convergence
theorem [32] shows that the social learning protocol (7) results
in social sensors forming an information cascade; that is, after
some time n∗, all sensors choose the same action and social
learning stops (see Theorem 5.3.1, [11]). Therefore, the true
state can never be estimated using social learning, indeed, the
belief will not converge to the true state asymptotically.
In this section, we show that by dynamically controlling the
incentives over time, the fusion center can indeed learn the true
state. However, this comes at the price of employing a sub-
optimal incentive policy. We further provide uniform bounds
on the additional cost incurred for consistency12.
A. Controlled Information Fusion
Fig.3 shows the bi-directional interaction between the fusion
center and the social sensor. The incentives chosen by the
fusion center affects the reward function of the social sensors,
and hence affects the decisions chosen. The decisions chosen
in turn affect the estimate of the state (1) for the fusion
center as in (7). Recall that social learning terminates after
a finite horizon (see remark on Information cascade after (8)).
Theorem 3 below shows how to control the incentives to the
social sensors to delay herding and information cascades, and
hence estimate the state asymptotically. In particular, it is
shown how the fusion center can control the incentives such
that the fusion of Bayesian estimates is consistent. We will
express13 the belief space Π(2) as a disjoint union of three
connected regions to describe the sensors’ decision dynamics
as a function of the incentive p: a region Pp1 - where action
a = 2 is optimal; a region Pp3 - where action a = 1 is optimal;
a region Pp2 - where action a = y is optimal. From (5), the
decision of the social sensor depends on the private belief ηy
and the reward ra (defined in (4)). Therefore, define:
Pp1 = {π ∈ Π(2) : (r1 − r2)
′ηy=1 ≤ 0}
Pp2 = {π ∈ Π(2) : (r1 − r2)
′ηy=1 > 0 ∩ (r1 − r2)
′ηy=2 ≤ 0}
Pp3 = {π ∈ Π(2) : (r1 − r2)
′ηy=2 > 0} (16)
where ra for a = {1, 2} are the social sensors’ rewards and P
p
models the explicit dependence of the width of the regions on
the incentive parameter p through ra, ηy=1 and ηy=2 denote
the private belief updates after y = 1 and y = 2 respectively.
The region Pp1 ∪P
p
3 is the herding region and P
p
2 is the social
learning region for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 3. Under (A1) and (A2), the following relation holds
between the incentive pk and the public belief πk+1:
πk+1 ∈


Pp3 iff pk ∈ [0,∆(ηyk=2));
Pp2 iff pk ∈ [∆(ηyk=2),∆(ηyk=1));
Pp1 iff pk ∈ [∆(ηyk=1), 1].
where the regions Ppi for i = 1, 2, 3 are defined in (16), and
∆(ηy) is as in (14).
12Let the true state be x = θ. The pair (θ, πk) is consistent, if πk converges
to a point mass at θ in probability.
13This is possible because of (A1) and (A2); see [7].
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Discussion: According to Theorem 3, relation between the
incentive pk at time k and the state estimate (public belief πk)
at the next instant k+1 is such that, when pk belongs to the in-
tervals defined by the private beliefs (in the incentive function
∆(ηyk)), the widths of the herding and social learning regions
change (see Fig.4) so that the public belief (πk+1) belongs to
the desired Ppi . Fig.4 shows the variation of the width of the
regions with respect to the incentive parameter p. Theorem 3
characterizes the sensitivity of the regions Pp1 ,P
p
2 ,P
p
3 with
respect to the incentive p ∈ [0, 1], and Corollary 4 below shows
how to stop the information cascade so that social learning can
proceed indefinitely so that the state estimate converges to the
true state.
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Fig. 4: Herding (P
p
1 ∪ P
p
3 ) and social learning (P
p
2 ) regions with
respect to the incentive parameter p. The parameters for the figure
are as in Table I. It is seen that when the incentives are small (close
to 0), the sensors herd on low quality actions (a = 1); and when
the incentives are high (close to 1), the sensors herd on high quality
actions (a = 2); however, only the actions in the social learning
region are informative or reflect the sensors’ true valuation.
Corollary 4. Let pk = ∆(ηyk=2) for k = 1, 2, . . .. The fusion
of Bayesian estimates is consistent, i.e, the fusion center learns
the true state asymptotically.
Discussion: We know that the fusion center can force the
state estimates to be in the social learning region by choosing
incentives in the range p ∈ [∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1)), see Fig.4.
From (16), Lemma 7 and Theorem 8 in the Appendix, the
social sensors’ decision likelihood matrices Rπa (as in (7)) in
regions Pp1 ,P
p
2 , and P
p
3 for any p ∈ [0, 1] are[
0 1
0 1
]
,
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
]
, and
[
1 0
1 0
]
respectively. In the herding region Pp1 ∪ P
p
3 , the decision of
the social sensor is independent of the public belief and the
public belief (7) is frozen. In the social learning region Pp2 ,
the sensors take informative14 actions; i.e, each sensor acts
according to its observation/valuation. In the social learning
region, sensors take informative actions a = y; or Rπa = B.
The observations are conditionally independent given the true
14Informativeness is in the sense of Blackwell; see [11]. For any two obser-
vation matrices B1 and B2, B1 is more informative than B2 in the Blackwell
sense (B1 ≻B B2) if B2 = B1Γ, for any stochastic matrix Γ. When
the sensors act according to their observations, π ∈ Pp
2
, and the decision
likelihood matrix in (7) Rpi
S
= B; and when the sensors don’t act according
to the observations (they herd), π ∈ Pp
3
, the decision likelihood matrix
Rpi
H
=
[
1 0
1 0
]
. We have for Γ =
[
1 0
1 0
]
, Rpi
H
= Rpi
S
Γ⇒ Rpi
S
≻B R
pi
H
.
state. Therefore, by suitably controlling the incentives, the
fusion center fuses information that is i.i.d on the true state. It
is well known [33], [34] that fusion of Bayesian estimates is
consistent (convergence in probability); i.e, for a point mass
at the true state θ denoted as g(θ),
lim
k→∞
P(|πk − g(θ)| > ǫ) = 0 ∀ ǫ > 0.
In other words, the fusion center can learn the true state
asymptotically by choosing the incentives as pk = ∆(ηyk=2)
for k = 1, 2, . . ..
B. Cost of consistency for the fusion center
When the incentive policy is the optimal threshold pol-
icy (15), the fusion of Bayesian estimates computed from the
social sensors’ decisions (7) is not consistent. This is because,
the optimal incentive policy for the fusion center is such
that below a certain threshold it is optimal to not incentivize
(see Fig.1a). From Theorem 3, when the fusion center stops
incentivizing p = µ∗(π) = 0, the public belief is in the herding
region Pp3 . In the herding region, social learning ceases and
there is no improvement in uncertainty – mean square error
between the state estimate and the true parameter remains at a
fixed non-zero value. If, however, the fusion center chooses
a sub-optimal policy (18), it will incur additional cost for
the incentives; but the fusion of estimates computed from the
social sensors’ decisions (7) will be consistent (Corollary 4).
Theorem 5 below provides uniform bounds on the additional
cost incurred by the fusion center for employing a sub-optimal
incentive policy to reduce the uncertainty (mean square error)
of the state estimate.
Consider the objective function for the fusion center:
Wµc(π) = Eµc{
∞∑
k=1
ρkcµc(pk)|π0 = π} (17)
where Wµc(π) denotes the cost incurred by employing the
sub-optimal policy (compare with (15))
µc(π) = {∆(ηy=2) ∀ π(2) ∈ [0, 1]} . (18)
Theorem 5. Let (A1) hold. The additional cost (on average)
incurred by the fusion center for employing the sub-optimal
policy µc(π) in (18) instead of the optimal policy µ
∗(π) in (15)
is bounded as:
sup
π
|Wµc(π) − Jµ∗(π)| ≤ 2
(1− φs)
1− ρ
e2(π
∗
s (1)−B21)
2
e2(π
∗
s (1)−B21)
2
− 1
(19)
where B21 = P(y = 1|x = 2), ρ is the discount factor, Jµ∗(π)
is the optimal cost (12), and π∗s denotes the optimal threshold
in (15).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Discussion: Theorem 5 characterizes the trade-off between
consistency and cost of information acquisition. It says that
when the fusion center employs a sub-optimal policy, the
average additional cost incurred is bounded above by four
parameters - the weight φs in the information fusion cost (6),
discount factor ρ that captures the degree of impatience of
the fusion center, the optimal threshold π∗ in (15), and the
information gathering capability of the sensors B defined
in (2).
The usefulness of Theorem 5 stems from the following:
(i) It gives an upper bound on the additional discounted cost
incurred when the fusion center chooses the incentives such
that the fusion of Bayesian estimates computed as in (7) is
consistent. (ii) It helps in choosing the weight φs and the
discount factor ρ for the fusion center.
Summary: Theorem 3 (together with Corollary 4) showed
how the fusion center can employ a sub-optimal incentive
policy such that information fusion with social sensors is
consistent, and Theorem 5 gave an uniform bound on the
average additional cost incurred for employing the sub-optimal
policy.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Sec.V-A below illustrates a controlled information fusion
with quadratic cost unlike (6). It is shown that a multi-
threshold incentive policy is optimal for the fusion center.
Sec.V-B illustrates the sensitivity of the optimal threshold
(15) to the parameters φs (the weight in (6)) and ρ (discount
factor in the objective (11)) that are chosen by the fusion
center. Sec.V-C illustrates the relation between the information
gathering capabilities of the sensor (observation matrix B in
(2)) and the average incentives provided by the fusion center.
Bellman’s equation (13) is solved by discretizing the state
space Π(2). The optimal incentive policy and the optimal cost
for the fusion center are computed by constructing a uniform
grid of 1000 points for π(2) ∈ [0, 1] and then implementing
the policy and value iteration algorithm [11] for a duration of
N = 100.
α1 = 0.288 α2 = 0.278 β1 = 0.11
β2 = 0.1 γ1 = 0.1 γ2 = 0.414
TABLE I: For δ1 = 0.3, δ2 = 0.95, the following parameters were
obtained as a solution of ∆(e1) = 1 and ∆(e2) = 0 for the reward
vector (4) parameters with the observation matrix B=
[
0.8 0.2
0.4 0.6
]
.
A. Multi-threshold Incentive Policies
This subsection illustrates numerically the nature of the
optimal incentive policies for formulations of the information
cost more general than (6), in particular we consider the
entropy cost. We will see that the optimal incentive policy
has a multi-threshold structure (as in Fig.1b).
Expenditure & Entropy Cost for Information Fusion: Sup-
pose the fusion center aims to minimize the expenditure to
receive truthful accounts of the information gathered by the
social sensors in addition to minimizing the entropy of the
state estimate, i.e,
c(p) = p+ ψe(π)Ce − φeI(a = y|π) (20)
where φe ∈ (0, 1) denotes the scalar weight, p denotes
the expenditure, ψe denotes the importance of the entropy
cost, and Ce = −
∑2
i=1 π(i)log2π(i) for π(i) ∈ (0, 1) and
Ce
∆
=0 for π(i) = {0, 1}. Fig.7 shows the optimal cost and
optimal policy for the fusion center when it considers entropy
of the state estimate in addition to the expenditure in the
information fusion cost (6). It can be seen that the optimal
policy has a multi-threshold structure, and the optimal cost is
discontinuous. A discontinuous cost implies a slight change in
the initial conditions will lead to significantly different costs.
Optimal policy being multi-threshold is unusual: it implies that
if it is optimal to incentivize at a particular belief, it need not
be optimal to do the same when the belief is larger.
B. Sensitivity of Optimal Incentive Policy
The following numerical results along with Theorem 5
provide a rationale for choosing the parameters: φs – the
weight in the information fusion cost (6) and ρ – the discount
factor in the fusion center’s objective (11).
(i) Usefulness of Information vs Incentivizing:
We illustrate the trade-off between usefulness of information
and incentivizing in the information fusion cost (6), and see
how it affects the threshold π∗s in (15). Fig.5 shows the affect
of increasing the weight φs when the remaining parameters
are the same. It can be seen that π∗s is decreasing with φs.
From Theorem 5, higher φs implies that the additional cost
for employing a sub-optimal policy is smaller; in other words,
π∗s (2) is smaller.
(ii) Optimal cost vs Discount factor:
We illustrate the relation between total cost incurred by the
fusion center for different discount factors ρ in the objective
function (11). The discount factor models the degree of
impatience of the fusion center, as the cost incurred at time k
is ρkc(pk). A smaller discount factor indicates that the fusion
center pays more attention to the current costs than future
costs. It is seen from Fig.6 that a higher discount factor leads
to smaller (expected) costs for higher states. This indicates that
it is beneficial for the fusion center to attach more importance
to future costs as it should also take into account the benefit
from sensors performing social learning.
C. Sample Path of Optimal Incentives
This subsection illustrates the sample path properties of the
optimal incentive sequence over time (which was characterized
in Theorem 2 to be a sub-martingale). Fig.8 shows the average
incentives provided to the social sensors over time. The fusion
center employs the optimal incentive policy (15) and fuses the
information revealed by social sensors in a Bayesian way (7).
Each sample path has a duration of N = 500, i.e, sequential
information fusion from 500 social sensors. The figure shows
the average over 100 independent such sample paths for three
different observation likelihood matrices (2).
We consider the following observation likelihood matrices
for illustrating the relation between the information gathering
capabilities of the sensor (2) and the average incentives
provided by the fusion center:B, B2, and B3. We know that B
is more informative than B2, which is in turn more informative
than B3, in the Blackwell sense [11] (see also Footnote 8).
Parameters: The parameters of the incentive function (14)
for B2 and B3 are specified in Table II.
In Fig.8, it can be seen that the range (or the slope) of the
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Fig. 5: Usefulness of information vs Incentivizing trade-off for the fusion center. It can be seen that pi∗(2) is decreasing with φs – a higher
weight will necessitate incentivizing sooner. According to Theorem 5, higher φs implies that the additional cost for employing a sub-optimal
policy is smaller; in other words, pi∗s is smaller. The parameters of the incentive function (14) are given in Table I and the discount factor
ρ = 0.4. Here φs denotes the weight in the information fusion cost (6).
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(a) Optimal Incentive Policy for discount factor ρ = 0.4.
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(b) Optimal Incentive Policy for discount factor ρ = 0.6.
Fig. 6: Optimal cost vs Discount factor. It is seen that a higher discount factor leads to smaller (expected) costs for higher states. This
indicates that it is beneficial for the fusion center to attach more importance to future costs as as it should also take into account the benefit
from sensors performing social learning. The parameters of the incentive function (14) are specified in Table I and the weight φs = 0.4.
Here ρ denotes the discount factor in the objective (11) and φs denotes the weight in the information fusion cost (6).
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of higher weight when the belief is smaller.
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(b) Discontinuous optimal cost.The parameters are as in (I) with φe =
0.4, discount factor ρ = 0.6, and ψe(pi) = 0.6 × I(pi(2) < 0.75) −
0.35×I(pi(2) > 0.75). Here ψe(pi) captures the requirement of higher
weight when the belief is smaller.
Fig. 7: Multi-threshold incentive policy with the entropy cost. The regions in the belief space Π(2) where it is optimal to not incentivize
µ∗(pi) = 0 is no more connected and convex. Having a connected region in the belief space where it is optimal not to incentivize has
implications on the confidence of the fusion center in implementing the incentive policy: once its optimal to incentivize at a certain belief,
it need not be optimal to continue incentivizing when the belief is larger, i.e, when it is more certain about the estimate of the state. The
optimal cost is discontinuous in Fig.7b, and this implies that a slight change in the initial conditions will lead to a significantly different
cost.
average incentives over the time horizon is highest for the
case of observation matrix B (compared to B2 and B3). This
is intuitive, for example, when an online social media review
platform like Amazon is soliciting honest reviews, gradual
increase in the compensation when the quality looks promising
(made possible by a more informative B) will lead to fair
reviews and this in turn will increase the sales of the product
or services in the future.
It can be seen from Fig.8 that the average incentives display
an increasing trend. This is useful in assessing how reliable
the fusion center is for providing incentives and estimating
the state. If the average payout does not display an increasing
trend, one could infer that either the reliability of the fusion
center is compromised or the social sensors are playing the
system.
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Fig. 8: The figure shows the incentives averaged over independent sample paths for the fusion center over time for observation matrices B,
B2 and B3. The observation matrices are ordered in the decreasing order of informativeness (see Footnote 8). The parameters are specified
in Tables I & II. The weight φs = 0.4 in the information fusion cost (6) and the discount factor ρ = 0.6. It can be seen that the range (or
the slope) of the average incentives over the time horizon is highest for the case of observation matrix B. The average incentives display an
increasing trend. The zoomed in subfigure shows the increasing trend in case of observation matrix B3. It can be seen that average incentives
offered in case of B3 is higher than B2 which in turn is higher than B. This can be attributed to the higher value of α in Table II.
Obs.
matrix B2
α1 = 0.3132 α2 = 0.3032 β1 = 0.11
β2 = 0.1 γ1 = 0.1 γ2 = 0.414
Obs.
matrix B3
α1 = 0.3233 α2 = 0.3133 β1 = 0.11
β2 = 0.1 γ1 = 0.1 γ2 = 0.414
TABLE II: The reward vector (4) parameters for B2 and B3. For
δ1 = 0.3, δ2 = 0.95, the following parameters were obtained as a
solution of ∆(e1) = 1 and ∆(e2) = 0 for the reward vector (4)
parameters with observation matrix B=
[
0.8 0.2
0.4 0.6
]
.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Unlike data fusion involving physical sensors for tracking
targets, this paper is motivated by information fusion with
social sensors, which provide reviews on social media review
platforms such as Amazon, Yelp, and Airbnb. Our main
objective is to control the information fusion by dynamically
providing incentives to the social sensors. We presented four
main results. Theorem 1 showed that under reasonable con-
ditions on the model parameters, the optimal incentive policy
has a threshold structure. The optimal policy is determined in
closed form, and is such that it switches once between two
exactly specified incentive policies. Theorem 2 characterized
the sample path property of the optimal incentive sequence that
results from fusion center employing the optimal threshold
policy. It was shown that the optimal incentive sequence is
a sub-martingale. Theorem 3 showed how the fusion center
can employ a sub-optimal policy and there by facilitate social
learning indefinitely, to learn the true state asymptotically. In
other words, it was shown how controlled information fusion
with social sensors can be consistent. Finally, Theorem 5 pro-
vided uniform bounds on the average additional cost incurred,
by employing a sub-optimal policy, for consistency.
While the formulation of the controlled information fusion
problem applies to arbitrary finite state, observation and action
spaces, our structural analysis of the optimal incentive policies
are currently applicable only to the 2-state case. Our results
for two states and observations, however, provide substantial
insight into the nature of the complexity of controlled infor-
mation fusion with social sensors, and highlight the means to
derive structural results for the optimal policy in a multi-state
case.
APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES:
Definition 1. First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) (≥s):
Let π1, π2 ∈ Π(2) be any two belief state vectors. Then π1 ≥s
π2 if
2∑
i=j
π1(i) ≥
2∑
i=j
π2(i) for j ∈ {1, 2}. (21)
Equivalently, π2 ≥s π1 iff for all v ∈ V , v
′π2 ≤ v
′π1, where
V denotes the space of 2-dimensional vectors v, with non-
increasing components, i.e, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . vX .
Definition 2. (Martingale [32]): Let Fk denote the sigma
algebra (as in (9)). A sequence {Xk} such that E[|Xk|] <∞
is a martingale (with respect to Fk) if
E[Xk+1|Fk] = Xk, for all k.
If E[Xk+1|Fk] ≥ Xk, for all k., the sequence {Xk} is a
sub-martingale.
Definition 3. ( [32]) A sequenceHk is said to be a predictable
sequence if Hk ∈ Fk−1.
In words, Hk may be predicted with certainty using the
information available at time k − 1.
Lemma 6 ( [11]). Under (A1), we have σ(π1, a) ≥s σ(π2, a),
where σ(π, a) =
[
1′Bπy=1π
1′Bπy=2π
]
.
Lemma 7 ( [7]). The sensor decision likelihood probability
matrix Rπ in the social learning filter (7) is computed as
Rπ = BMπ where (22)
Mπy,a = P(a|y, π)
= I(r′aByπ > r
′
a¯Byπ), where a¯ = A
Theorem 8 ( [7]). Let (A1) and (A2) hold. The belief space
Π(2) can be partitioned into at most 3 non-empty regions
P1,P2,P3. On each each of these regions, the sensor decision
likelihood matrix Rπ in (22) is a constant with respect to the
belief state π.
Theorem 9 ( [32]). Let Wk be a sub-martingale. If Hk ≥ 0
is predictable and each Hk is bounded, then (H.W )k is a
sub-martingale.
Theorem 9 corresponds to Theorem 5.2.5 in [32].
APPENDIX B
PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1:
We first show that due to the structure of the social learning
filter in (7), the choice of incentives reduces from a continuum
[0, 1] to a finite number at every belief. Next, we show that
the incentive function ∆(ηy) is decreasing in π for any y.
Theorem 10. Let ∆(ηy=1) and ∆(ηy=2) be two possible
incentives at belief π. Under (A1) and (A2), the Q function
in (13) can be simplified as:
Q(π, p) =


p+ ρV (π) if p ∈ [0,∆(ηy=2));
p− φs + ρEV (π) if p ∈ [∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1));
p+ ρV (π) if p ∈ [∆(ηy=1), 1].
(23)
and V (π) = minQ(π, p). Here,
EV (π) = 1′Bπy=1π × V (ηy=1) + 1
′Bπy=2π × V (ηy=2).
Proof of Theorem 10:
From Lemma 3 and Theorem 8, we have
Rπ =


[
1 0
1 0
]
if p ∈ [0,∆(ηy=2));[
B11 B12
B21 B22
]
if p ∈ [∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1));[
0 1
0 1
]
if p ∈ [∆(ηy=1), 1].
(24)
From (24), it is clear that the sensors’ decision
a =


1 if p ∈ [0,∆(ηy=2));
y if p ∈ [∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1));
2 if p ∈ [∆(ηy=1), 1].
(25)
Therefore,
∑
a∈A
V (T π(π, a))σ(π, a) =


V (π) if p ∈ [0,∆(ηy=2));
EV (π) if p ∈ [∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1));
V (π) if p ∈ [∆(ηy=1), 1].
(26)
where EV (π) = 1′Bπy=1π × V (ηy=1) + 1
′Bπy=2π × V (ηy=2).
The result follows.
Theorem 10 represents the Q function (13) over the range
[0, 1] into three regions. The following corollary highlights
why such a partition is useful.
Corollary 11. At every public belief π ∈ Π(2), it is sufficient
to choose one of the three incentives {0,∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1)}.
Proof. From Theorem 10, the instantaneous reward is a
linear function in p and argminp∈[0,∆(ηy=2))Q(π, p) = 0,
argminp∈[∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1))Q(π, p) = ∆(ηy=2), and
argminp∈[∆(ηy=1),1]Q(π, p) = ∆(ηy=1). These hold as for
any value of p in each of the three regions, the corresponding
continuation payoff is the same from Theorem 10.
Lemma 12. The incentive function ∆(ηy) is decreasing in π
for every y.
Proof. The incentive function is given as (14), where
l1, l2, l3 > 0. With π = [1− π(2), π(2)]
′, differentiating w.r.t
π(2),
d(∆(ηy))
dπ(2)
= −(l1 + l2)B1yB2y < 0
Proof of Theorem 1:
From Corollary 11 the value function (13) is:
V (π) = min{ρV (π),
∆(ηy=2)− φs + ρEV (π),
∆(ηy=1) + ρV (π)}.
⇒ V (π) = min{0,∆(ηy=2)− φs + ρEV (π)}, (27)
as ∆(ηy=1) ≥ 0.
By using the value iteration algorithm [11] on (27), we have
Vn+1(π) = min{0,∆(ηy=2)− φs + ρEVn(π)} (28)
with V0(π) = 0 ∀ π.
From Lemma 12, the incentive function is decreasing. From
the definition of First-Order Stochastic Dominance (21), and
Lemma 6, we have EVn(π) is decreasing in π. Therefore,
Vn+1(π) and hence V (π) is decreasing in π.
Let V (0) and V (1) denote the values for π =
{[
1
0
]
,
[
0
1
]}
. It
is seen by substitution that EV (0) = V (0) and EV (1) =
V (1). By definition, we know that ∆(ηy) ∈ [0, 1]. Using
Lemma 12, let ∆(e1) = 1 and ∆(e2) = 0. The value function
for the fusion center is given by (27). We have the following:
1) For V (π) = ∆(ηy=2)−φs+ρEV (π), V (0) =
1−φs
(1−ρ) > 0,
and V (1) = −φs(1−ρ) < 0.
2) For V (π) = 0, V (0) = V (1) = 0.
The value function V (π) in (27) is decreasing with a positive
value at e1 and a negative value e2, so must be zero at some
point(s). Let Σ = {π(2)|0 = ∆(ηy=2)−φs+ρEV (π)}. Since
the value function V (π) is monotone in π, the set Σ is convex.
Choosing π∗s (2) = {πˆ(2)|πˆ(2) > π(2) ∀ π(2) ∈ Σ}, the result
follows.
Proof of Theorem 2:
We will first establish the property of the incentive function
∆(ηy) as the optimal policy depends on it.
Lemma 13. Under (A1), ∆(ηy=1) is concave in π, and
∆(ηy=2) is convex in π.
Proof of Lemma 13:
The incentive function ∆(ηy=2) is given in (14). A differen-
tiable function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is convex if
f(w1) ≥ f(w2) + f
′(w2)(w1 − w2), for all w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1].
(29)
A function f is concave if −f is convex.
From (29) with w1 = π1(2) and w2 = π2(2), and using
Lemma 6, it is verified that the function ∆(ηy=2) is convex in
π. Similarly, it can be shown that∆(ηy=1) is concave in π.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Consider the sub-optimal policy µˆ(π) given as
µˆ(π) =
{
∆(ηy=2)− ǫ if π(2) ∈ [0, π∗(2));
∆(ηy=2) if π(2) ∈ [π∗(2), 1].
Here ǫ > 0 and π∗(2) ∈ [0, 1]. Let Wk = µˆ(πk−1).
From Lemma 13, ∆(ηy=2) is convex in π. Let u
S(πk+1) =
∆(ηyk=2) denote the price at time k+1. So u
S(π) is convex
in π.
We know that the public belief πk is a martingale
15 [24], i.e,
E[πk+1|Fk] = πk. For ǫ→ 0,
E[Wk+1|Fk] = E[u
S(πk+1)|Fk] ≥ u
S(E[πk+1|Fk]) ≥ u
S(πk) ≥Wk
by Jensen’s inequality and martingale property of the public
belief. Therefore Wk(= µˆ(πk−1)) is a sub-martingale.
Consider a function µ¯(π) given by
µ¯(π) =
{
0 if π(2) ∈ [0, π∗(2));
1 if π(2) ∈ [π∗(2), 1].
Let Hk = µ¯(πk−1). From Theorem 9, (H.W )k is a sub-
martingale. But (H.W )k = pk. Therefore, the optimal
incentive sequence pk = µ
∗(πk−1) is a sub-martingale,
E[pk+1|Fk] ≥ pk, i.e, it increases on average over time.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We’ll prove that π ∈ Pp2 iff p ∈ [∆(ηy=2),∆(ηy=1)). Other
cases are proved similarly.
From (4), we can write
r1 = [(δ1p− β1B12) (δ1p− α1 − β1B22 − γ1)] (30)
r2 = [(δ2p− β2B11 − α2 − k2) (δ2p− β2B21 − γ2)].
By definition,
Pp2 = {π ∈ Π(2) : (r1−r2)
′ηy=1 > 0 ∩ (r1−r2)
′ηy=2 ≤ 0}.
We have,
(r1 − r2)
′ηy=1 > 0
⇔ p <
1
δ2 − δ1
{[α2 − α1]ηy=1 + [β2 − β1]B
′ηy=1}
+
(γ2 − γ1)
δ2 − δ1
= ∆(ηy=1).
(r1 − r2)
′ηy=2 ≤ 0
⇔ p ≥
1
δ2 − δ1
{[α2 − α1]ηy=2 + [β2 − β1]B
′ηy=2}
+
(γ2 − γ1)
δ2 − δ1
= ∆(ηy=2).
15From (7), we have P(ak+1|Fk) = 1
′R
pik
ak+1
πk. We have
E[πk+1|Fk] = R
pik
ak+1=1
πk + R
pik
ak+1=2
πk
E[πk+1|Fk] = (R
pik
ak+1=1
+R
pik
ak+1=2
)πk
(⇒)E[πk+1|Fk] = πk.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Define the following region in the belief space Π(2):
H = {π|π(2) ≤ π∗(2)}. (31)
Here H denotes the region where the optimal policy in (15) is
such that µ∗(π) = 0. First, we will characterize the probability
that a sample path πk, for k = 1, 2, · · · belongs to the region
H when the fusion center chooses pk = ∆(ηyk).
Lemma 14. Let the true state be x = θ. Let the fusion center
incentivize as pk = ∆(ηyk) for k = 1, 2, · · · . We have the
following for the state estimate πk:
P(πk ∈ H) ≤ e
−2k(π∗s (1)−Bθ1)
2
(32)
where the optimal threshold in (15) π∗s (1) = {π(1) : µ
∗(π) =
0 ∀ π(1) ∈ [π∗s (1), 1]} and Bθ1 = P(y = 1|x = θ).
Proof of Lemma 14:
From Theorem 3, we have that the decision likelihood matrix
Rπa = B when pk = ∆(ηyk). Let the true state be θ.
Conditioned on the state, the observations are independent.
Define the Bernoulli random variable
Zk =
{
0 if ak = 2;
1 if ak = 1.
(33)
Let Zˆk =
∑k
t=1
Zt
k
denote the binomial random variable. By
Hoeffding’s Inequality [35], for ǫ > 0
P(Zˆk − E(Z) > ǫ) ≤ e
−2kǫ2
where E(Z) = Bθ1.
Choosing16 ǫ = π∗s (1)− E(Z), we have
P(Zˆk > π
∗
s (1)) ≤ e
−2k(π∗s (1)−E(Z))
2
P(Zˆk > π
∗
s (1)) ≤ e
−2k(π∗s (1)−Bθ1)
2
P(πk ∈ H) = P(Z¯k > π
∗(1))
Therefore, we have P(πk ∈ H) ≤ e
−2k(π∗s (1)−Bθ1)
2
.
Proof of Theorem 5:
For any sub-optimal policy µc and the corresponding cost
Wµc(π), it is clear that Wµc(π) − Jµ∗(π) ≥ 0 ∀ π. Let I
denote the indicator function. We have
Wµc(π)− Jµ∗(π) = I(π ∈ H){Wµc(π)− Jµ∗(π)}
+ I(π /∈ H){Wµc(π)− Jµ∗(π)}
⇒ sup
π
|Wµc(π)− Jµ∗(π)| ≤
{
sup
π
I(π ∈ H){Wµc(π) − Jµ∗(π)}
}
+
{
sup
π
I(π /∈ H){Wµc(π)− Jµ∗(π)}
}
.
(34)
where H is defined in (31). From Theorem 1, we know that
Jµ∗(π) = V (π) is monotone (non-increasing) in π. Similar
arguments can be used to establish that Wµc (π) is monotone
(non-increasing) in π. Therefore, we have for (34)
sup
π
|Wµc(π) − Jµ∗(π)| ≤ 2
{
sup
π
I(π ∈ H)Wµc(π)
}
(35)
16If π∗s (1)−E(Z) < 0, then the random variable 1−Z will make ǫ > 0.
as Jµ∗(π) = 0 ∀ π ∈ H from (27) and Theorem 1. Let c
S
µ and
cIµ denote the cost incurred by the fusion center employing a
policy µ when it stops incentivizing and incentivizes respec-
tively. We have for π0 = π, the cost functions Jµ∗(π) and
Wµc(π):
Jµ∗(π) = Eµ∗
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρk{I(πk ∈ H)c
S
µ∗(pk) + I(πk /∈ H)c
I
µ∗(pk)}
}
,
Wµc(π) = Eµc
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρk{I(πk ∈ H)c
S
µc
(pk) + I(πk /∈ H)c
I
µc
(pk)}
}
.
We have cSµ∗(p) = 0, c
I
µ∗(p) = ∆(ηy=2) − φs, c
S
µc
(p) =
∆(ηy=2)− φs, and c
I
µc
(p) = ∆(ηy=2)− φs.
The set H defined in (31) is compact by definition. For the
discount factor ρ ∈ [0, 1) and bounded instantaneous costs, the
average discounted cost is bounded [11]. Therefore in (35),
sup
π
{I(π ∈ H)Wµc (π)} = max
π
{I(π ∈ H)Wµc(π)}
and π˜ = argmaxπ{I(π ∈ H)Wµc(π)}. We have for π0 = π˜,
max
π
{I(π ∈ H)Wµc(π)} = Eµc
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρk{I(πk ∈ H)c
S
µc
(pk)}
∣∣∣π0 = π˜}
≤ Eµc
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρkI(πk ∈ H) max
∆(ηy):π∈H
cSµc(pk)
}
≤ (1− φs)E
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρkI(πk ∈ H)
}
≤
(1− φs)
1− ρ
{ ∞∑
k=1
P(πk ∈ H)
}
From Lemma 14, we have P(πk ∈ H) ≤ e
−2k(π∗s (1)−Bθ1)
2
.
Noting that under (A1), B11 ≥ B21, the result follows.
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